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ABSTRACT: Events in Ukraine have rekindled discussions about NATO’s post 
Cold War purpose and the way it relates to the EU. Through EU sanctions and a 
traditional military response from NATO, the West has manoeuvred itself into a 
paradoxical situation where every step it takes to reassure its Eastern allies 
increases rather than diffuses tensions with Russia. On the one hand, it seems that 
decades of carefully crafted strategic narratives of de-escalation are now in limbo. 
On the other, it might have indeed been the sustained attempt to create a liberal 
post-Cold War order that produced an “integration dilemma”, and ultimately 
drove Russia to the defensive realist logic of a Waltzian “security dilemma”. We 
argue that NATO’s reaction might have been based on a stylised threat and 
historical resentments rather than on a carefully calculated risk. Looking beyond 
the EU and NATO’s recent strategic choices, we argue that the situation can only 
be resolved by re-engaging Russia in a renewed de-escalatory dialogue that 
involves both the EU and NATO with a greater emphasis on the nuanced, but 
important, distinctions between the integration and security dilemmas. 
Keywords: EU-NATO; Ukraine; Russia; integration dilemma; security dilemma; 
 
Introduction 
Russia’s sudden invasion of Georgia in 2008, its annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and 
subsequent infiltrations in Ukraine including the constant testing of European territorial air and 
sea defences raised awareness in the West “about the possibility of military attack and 
occupation” (Blockmans and Faleg 2015, p. 2) and thereby also sparked a new round of debates 
regarding NATO’s future and how the “the return of war on Europe’s border” would affect the 
Alliance’s political and institutional relationship with the EU (European Union 2015, p. 11). 
For some, this is the continuation of a debate that started with the end of the Cold War when, 
in the face of the demise of the Soviet Union, NATO seemed to have lost its primary purpose. 
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At the time, structural realists declared NATO a “disappearing thing” (Waltz 1990 cited in 
Hellmann and Wolf 1993, p. 3) while liberal institutionalists saw a window of opportunity for 
the Alliance to change and adapt to a changing security environment (see e.g. Haftendorn, 
Keohane & Wallender 1999), an effort that some portrayed as a “metamorphosis from Cold 
War nightmare to post-Cold War daydream” (Booth and Wheeler 1992, p. 21). As part of a 
comprehensive re-make and demonstration of its continued relevance, NATO attempted a 
transformation from classic military alliance into an organisation with broader political 
ambitions, adding to its role of security guarantor for Europe the one of “democracy promoter” 
and “global interventionist” and thereby converging somewhat with EU efforts to develop its 
own comprehensive security and foreign policy profile (Wolff 2009, p. 476). Meanwhile, the 
development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) had to be couched as 
something that was not aimed to openly challenge the role of NATO and would instead focus 
on complementing it. 
The discussion surrounding NATO’s utility was rekindled in the context of the Russia-
Georgian war in 2008, peaked again in 2009 on the occasion of the Alliance’s sixtieth 
anniversary and, more recently, in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea.  The lines 
of the debate are reasonably well-rehearsed: NATO has outlived its usefulness, especially in a 
world with many new security threats that often emanate from non-state actors, and it is in 
strategic limbo following the U.S. pivot towards Asia and the long-standing failure of other 
Alliance members, including large EU member states, to adequately support NATO (Carpenter 
2016). The riposte is just as well-rehearsed: NATO remains relevant because it has proven that 
it can adapt and operate “out of area” and, with strong American leadership, the Alliance will 
not only endure, with adaptation, but contribute to a more secure world (Atlantic Council 
2016). There are of course more nuanced accounts of why and how NATO needs to adapt and 
to what (e.g. Hallams, Ratti and Zyla 2014; Webber and Hyde-Price 2016). However, the 
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salient point here is that the need for NATO to redefine its raison d’être has been on the agenda 
since the end of the Cold War, along with the question of whether the Europeans would build 
their own, autonomous system of security governance alongside it and how this would affect 
EU-NATO cooperation.  
At the official level there are increasingly long protestations of NATO’s continued relevance.1 
The EU, at least in part, acknowledges this by agreeing that NATO has been “the bedrock of 
Euro-Atlantic security for almost 70 years” and that “it remains the strongest and most effective 
military alliance in the world” (EUGS 2016, p. 36). However, the EU’s Global Strategy also 
reflects the institutional membership asymmetries, noting that EU-NATO relations shall not 
prejudice the security and defence policies of the EU’s six non-NATO members.2 This then 
leads to some careful language on EU-NATO cooperation, whereby cooperation will be 
deepened “in complementarity, synergy, and full respect for the institutional framework, 
inclusiveness and decision-making autonomy of the two” (EUGS 2016, p. 20). Away from the 
niceties of official communications and communiqués, post-Cold War relations between the 
EU and NATO have been cloaked in ambivalence, and since 2004 in particular they are best 
described as “formal non-cooperation” at the political level, with various informal forms of ad 
hoc cooperation in the field (see Gebhard, Smith and Tomic in this volume; Græger and 
Haugevik 2013; Gebhard and Smith 2015; Græger 2016; Himmrich and Raynova 2017).3  
The difficulties associated with formal cooperation between the EU and NATO are 
often ascribed to the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the Union in 2004, thus 
institutionalising differences over the Cyprus issue between the respective organisations 
(Tzimitras and Hatay 2016, 7-8). This, however, over-simplifies the picture since the two 
organisations have been tacitly competing for a middle-ground in security, concentrating on 
crisis management since the end of the Cold War. The lack of an obvious territorial threat 
undermined the centrality of NATO’s Article 5 (mutual self-defence in case of territorial 
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aggression) and led the Alliance to stress its relevance with regard to a wider set of security 
challenges. The EU’s relatively young security and defence policy (which later became the 
CSDP) was developing in the same direction with the assumption of a broad set of 
peacekeeping activities from the Western European Union with the Treaty of Amsterdam of 
1999. Hence even prior to 2004 questions of institutional prestige and even survival were tied 
up with issues of the appropriate levels of cooperation and potential overlap (and, behind closed 
doors, competition).  
Aspects of de jure formal EU-NATO cooperation continued between the organisations 
at the civilian and military levels (the latter often comprising dual-hatted representatives) but 
with very restrictive agendas, limited mainly to the Western Balkans, and the exchange of 
classified information. De facto cooperation is however limited by the asymmetrical 
membership of the organisations as it relates to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, which is why the 
emphasis tends to be on more pragmatic and informal modes of cooperation. The prevalent 
“formal non-cooperation” has contributed to the lack of “respective strategic specificity” (Duke 
and Vanhoonacker 2015, p. 153) between the two organisations. However, the twin shocks 
imparted on the EU and NATO by the Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008, and 
subsequently, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the destabilisation of the Donbass region, 
have put renewed pressure on both to inject “new impetus and new substance” into their 
relations (EU-NATO Declaration: 2016).    
NATO responded to “this changed security environment by enhancing its deterrence 
and defence posture, including by a forward presence in the eastern part of the Alliance, and 
by suspending all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia […]” 
(NATO 2016b).  NATO also enhanced its security ties with Finland and Sweden to reassess 
security in the Baltic Sea, a Readiness Action Plan was agreed to in 2014 at the Alliance’s 
Wales summit, complete with a 5,000 strong Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) 
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within the NATO Response Force (NRF).4 The downing of MH17 in July 2014 made the task 
of those favouring quiet and patient diplomacy far more difficult. Air defences were boosted 
since 2014 with six allies responding to the demand for air-to-ground precision guided 
munitions. Sixteen allies, led by Germany, is “establishing larger formations to deliver usable 
forces and capabilities” (NATO 2016b).  
A U.S.-European Reassurance Initiative in June 2016 included agreement to rotate an 
Armoured Brigade Combat Team as well as pre-positioned stocks in the Baltic States. The 
Viségrad Group is to provide a rotational presence in the Baltic states from 2017, while the UK 
is in the process of creating a Joint Expeditionary Force with  Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands and Norway. This will complement the UK-France Combined Joint 
Expeditionary Force which held its first exercises in 2016. Further initiatives, such as a 
multinational letter of intent for cooperation on the provision of Airborne Electronic Attack 
suggest that the Nordic-Baltic region will continue to be a priority for the forthcoming years 
(see further Saxi 2017).  
Elsewhere in Brussels, the Ukraine crisis struck the EU at an extremely vulnerable time, 
as it was buffeted by a financial crisis, followed soon thereafter by a migration crisis and the 
rise of xenophobia and populism in much of western Europe. The events unfolding between 
the Russian incursions into Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 also coincided with the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the subsequent introduction of the multi-hatted High 
Representative/Vice-President as well as the creation of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS). An attempt by the EU to relaunch the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2015 
came too late to have a substantive impact on the situation. The ENP, and with it the EU’s 
Eastern Partnership (EaP), now had to contend with the reality that borders that were designed 
to be deliberately fuzzy had in fact become clearly defined and militarised.5 
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The succession of external shocks, combined with institutional navel-gazing, led to the 
build-up of an existential crisis within the EU, raising fundamental questions about the bloc’s 
regional and international role (see also Duke 2017). The initial response to the Ukraine crisis 
was largely outsourced to Germany and France while the organisation as a whole was 
somewhat marginalised in the process. The EU sought to stabilise the domestic situation in 
Ukraine and coordinated economic sanctions against Russia, whilst also trying to keep the 
doors open for dialogue with Moscow. These efforts were accompanied by encouragement for 
Kiev in its move towards a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement. The Maidan 
demonstrations had shown a strong pro-EU vocation and the EU response therefore favoured 
a negotiation process in Minsk, with the leaders of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine, while 
at the same time applying sanctions based upon the overall understanding that any solution will 
be political, not military.  
While NATO and the EU have each played their roles, there is little to suggest that they 
have yet found a path out of their respective existential crises. That said, there are modest signs 
that “operationalising parallel procedures and playbooks for interaction” in specific areas are 
being operationalised, such as countering hybrid threats, cooperation on maritime issues and 
exercises (Council 2016). Notwithstanding diplomatic proclamations of a “new era of 
cooperation” between the EU and NATO, as the December 2016 Joint Declaration put it,  war 
in Syria, Da’esh and deteriorating relationships with Turkey continue to pose complex 
challenges to the Euro-Atlantic security community. Brexit has created additional 
complications, which will occupy policy-makers and planners within both organisations for 
some time.6 The West’s obvious paucity of strategic tools with which to engage Russia is thus, 
on the one hand, only symptomatic of a more comprehensive set of problems. On the other 
hand, a deeper understanding of the factors that have led the West into this strategic impasse 
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with Russia can provide useful insights for the wider issues this organisational relationship is 
facing. 
Conceptualising the strategic deadlock with Russia 
Leading up to the events of 2014, both the EU and NATO had been repeating their liberalist 
mantras of soft power and multilateralism while moving towards association agreements and 
deep and comprehensive free trade agreements. Enhanced relations with the EU’s and NATO’s 
Eastern partners, including Georgia and Armenia, have been perceived by the Kremlin as 
geopolitical moves increasingly at variance with key Russian interests in its heterogenous and 
diverse “inner abroad”. Arguably, this led to a sort of “integration dilemma” which Charap and 
Troitskiy (2013, p. 50) have proposed as a prism for examining NATO’s enlargement and the 
EU’s engagement in the Eastern Partnership7 and the effects these had on the relationship with 
Russia: 
[…] one state perceives as a threat to its own security or prosperity its neighbours’ 
integration into military alliances or economic groupings that are closed to it. This 
exclusivity is the source of the dilemma: it transforms integration, a positive-sum process 
by definition, into a zero-sum game for the state that is excluded from the integration 
initiatives offered to its neighbours. As with the security dilemma, the intentions of the 
neighbours or the backers of integration initiatives need not be hostile to the state in 
question for an integration dilemma to materialise. 
Even if actions are not intended to produce outward-facing effects at all, they may even be 
perceived as direct threats by those excluded from the integration effort. This may lead to 
defensive acts on the part of those who feel threatened to restore the status quo ante, including 
through offensive, military means. The attendant sense of uncertainty drives threat perceptions 
and eventually leads to the construction of threats on both sides, undermining not only the 
original integration in question but also the scope for further integration. Much like in a security 
dilemma (see Jervis 1978), the zero-sum logic of the integration dilemma captures the principal 
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partners in an “escalatory spiral” while placing those who are the object of various integration 
schemes in limbo (Charap and Troitskiy 2013, p. 60).  
Charap and Troitskiy’s (2013) “integration dilemma” is a variant of the security 
dilemma with the point of contention lying in the “exclusivity” (and thus perceived rebuttal) 
associated with membership of the EU or NATO. In the Waltzian defensive realist variant of 
the “security dilemma” (Waltz 1979) the enlargement of NATO (under the agreement of all 
major European states) and associated measures, such as ballistic missile defences, or the 
bolstering of the Alliance’s military presence in the Baltic states as measures provoking and 
requiring adequate responses on the part of Russia to maintain strategic balance: the buttressing 
of Russia’s military expenditure, and Putin’s defensive westward deployment of military forces 
can all be framed that way. That said, defensive realism offers less of a straightforward 
explanation for Russia’s armed intervention in Crimea and eastern Ukraine; following Van 
Evera’s (1999) idea of abrupt balancing, for a status quo oriented power like Russia, forward 
aggression constitutes more of an exceptional move, and one that bears the risk of self-defeat. 
In this sense, Russia had to turn to aggression temporarily to intimidate its western neighbours 
and thereby prevent more robust action in the future but Putin would eventually nevertheless 
recognise the more beneficial long-term effects of defensive balancing.  
Meanwhile, offensive realist John Mearsheimer (2014) suggested that “Putin’s 
pushback should have come as no surprise”, neither in principle nor in terms of his specific 
tactical approach. The annexation of Crimea was clearly aimed at pre-empting potential 
secession and the loss of key military bases. Moreover, it was a direct reaction and response to 
US and European leaders’ attempts “to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia's 
border” (p. 77), a spiral logic that can of course be easily reversed to explain as well as justify 
NATO’s vigorous response ever since (see further below). Putin would – and will – continue 
to seek opportunities for confrontation, and use the deterrent effect of the threat of further 
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forward aggression n short, defensive and offensive variants of the security dilemma differ in 
their assumptions about the desirable and more effective way of securing a state’s interests: 
through defensive balancing on the one hand and aggressive forward expansion and conquest 
on the other. The question is then whether NATO’s specific response, too, was simply the 
manifestation of such a “security dilemma” or whether it was based on a focused, strategic 
assessment of specific situational imperatives (“risks”). The following section will explore 
these two competing explanations before we return to a discussion of how an “integration 
dilemma” might indeed have evolved between the West and Russia. 
A classic security dilemma? 
Although events in Ukraine following the Maidan protests in 2014 saw the initial western 
reactions concentrate upon diplomatic measures, restrictive instruments and economic 
sanctions, Russian military aggression against NATO members appeared plausible. The 
sizeable Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia are but one commonly cited pretext for 
various types of hybrid intervention to nominally protect ethnic Russians (Lanoszka 2016; 
Posener 2016). Although there was no firm evidence in the public domain to actually prove 
any such Russian hostile intent vis-à-vis the Baltic States and Poland, the implied threat fed 
readily into specific historical resentment against Russia in the Baltic states and more general 
Cold War biases elsewhere. Even in the absence of any proven Russian hostile intention, a 
tapestry of reports resulting from the Donbass region and Russia’s proxy involvement, along 
with large-scale Russian military exercises and repositioning of forces on NATO’s northern 
littoral, lend ready credence to the supposition (see also Monaghan 2015).  
Hypothetical war scenarios were given weight in particular by the U.S. Senate which 
drew a direct line from the annexation of Crimea, to Russia’s meddling in east Ukraine, to an 
imminent risk to the Baltic states. The Russia Aggression Prevention Act in May 2014 
contained not only extensive recommendations for sanctions, but also to accelerate BMD 
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efforts, to increase NATO armed support for the Baltic states, intelligence support to Ukraine 
regarding Russian military movements and that major non-ally status should be accorded to 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine which included possible “transfer of defense articles or defense 
services” (U.S. Senate 2014).  
One of the most influential, if alarmist, vindicators was a RAND Report which 
suggested that Tallinn and Riga could be overrun by Russian forces within 60 hours. The report 
concluded, “As currently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most 
exposed members” (Shlapak and Johnson 2016, p. 4). A programme screened on BBC in 
February 2016, entitled “World War Three: Inside the War Room” was based on a hypothetical 
scuffle at a Soviet war memorial in Tallinn. This was followed by discontent about the lack of 
self-determination in Latvia and balaclava wearing figures removing Latvian and EU flags in 
an eastern region which became a kind of Baltic Donbass, with fingers nervously poised over 
nuclear buttons.  The similarities with “real life” images emerging from the Ukraine’s east, 
plus the reversion to Cold War stereotypes, lent credence to the notion of an imminent threat, 
as did repeated infractions by Russia of NATO air and sea space, sometimes without 
transponders on (Reuters 2016). Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and subsequent 
military actions in Ukraine and large scale short-notice military exercises near or on NATO 
borders with 30-80,000 troops, provided a further rationale for a reassessment of the collective 
defence of NATO’s eastern flank, or the Nordic-Baltic region.8 Above all, it sparked intense 
debate about whether and how NATO could, or would, respond to any such unfolding threat. 
A decision in 2016 for a one-time four-fold increase in the U.S. defence budget for 
Europe in 2017, from $789 million in 2015, to $3.4 billion, was made in light of American 
concerns about a “revanchist” Russia and as part of a “European Reassurance Initiative” 
(House of Representatives: 2017, p. 453). The extra spending will be directed towards 
stockpiling tanks, artillery and training in the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Germany, Poland and 
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Romania. The proposal formally retains the U.S. military presence in Europe at 60,000 and the 
extra 4,000 troops (an armoured brigade) on rotational deployment. The rotational forces will 
be backed up by the larger rapid reaction force of 40,000.  Some allies, like Poland, demanded 
a permanent military presence but this was balanced against the wider concern about provoking 
Moscow and possible violation of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act which bans NATO 
from establishing permanent military bases in Central Europe.  
In spite of the rotational nature of NATO’s deployments to the Baltic states, Russia 
portrayed this as a violation of the 1997 Russia-NATO Founding Act. Exercises in April 2017, 
described as routine from NATO’s perspective, were seen as a threat to Russia by Russia’s 
Deputy Foreign Minister, Aleksey Meshkov, that “gravely increase the risk of incidents”’ 
based on an erroneous ‘Russia threat’ myth” (Gorka 2017). No matter how vigorously NATO 
issues counter-claims and denials, perceptions remain the key drivers of the security dilemma.  
Prospects for NATO-Russia deconfliction are hard to ascertain, especially when Russia 
has “breached the values, principles and commitments which underpin the NATO-Russia 
relationship, as outlined in the 1997 Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council” 
(NATO 2016b). Dialogue is not only complicated by the annexation of Crimea, but also by the 
non-recognition of the treaties signed between Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, its non-
observance of treaties such as the INF treaty, military presence and actions in Syria on behalf 
of the Assad regime and its ongoing military build-up in the Black Sea. From the Russian 
perspective the 2016 National Security Strategy portrays NATO as a strategic threat to the 
homeland through its superiority in high-precision and long-range conventional strike 
capabilities, nuclear weapons, missile defences and other kinetic and non-kinetic forms of 
warfare (Sokolsky 2017, p. 3). Even when it comes to popular western fears of “hybrid 
warfare”, the Kremlin likely sees democracy promotion as a form of western hybrid warfare 
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against Russia and its allies (potentially an indication of another dimension of a looming 
“integration dilemma”). The same applies to cyber warfare (Sokolosky 2017, p. 4).  
Although there may well be an element of political grandstanding in such Russian 
perceptions, cruise missile strikes against targets at Shayrat airbase in Syria by U.S. warships 
in the Eastern Mediterranean have reinforced the impression that, according to Russian Prime 
Minister Dmitry Medvedev, U.S. strikes were one step away from clashing with Russia’s 
military (Reuters 2017).  
To return to Charap and Troitskiy’s “integration dilemma” the exclusivity that stems 
from membership or close(r) association with the EU or NATO, and not Russia, is the key 
issue. But, whilst acknowledging that the integration dilemma is a variant of the security 
dilemma, the question still remains of how the respective concepts differ and how they are 
distinguishable in practice.  Is one part and parcel of the other? Is it possible for the West to be 
caught in an integration dilemma without necessarily being in a security dilemma and vice 
versa? What are the implications of greater differentiation between the dilemmas for EU, 
NATO and Russia relations? 
 
A security dilemma and/or an integration dilemma? 
In their (2013) treatment of the “integration dilemma”, Charap and Troitskiy (2013) do not 
account for the types of “integration” mooted respectively by NATO and the EU. Both 
organisations have expanded to the east and thus into the Russian sphere of influence, but there 
is a difference in the nature of NATO’s enlargement and that of the EU’s post-2004 
engagement with what became the EaP. Our discussion proceeds on the assumption that 
recognition of such a distinction may be key to unravelling the intricacies that have led each 
organisation into the geostrategic situation they now find themselves in.  
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The establishment of a Permanent Joint Council in NATO in 1997, which was then 
followed by a NATO-Russia Council in 2002, reinforced the idea that the Alliance had been 
acting with at least some sensitivity towards Russia.  The honouring of the understanding that 
there should be no permanent military forces deployed in the post-Soviet NATO members, or 
the change in deployment of land-based ballistic missile defence systems in the Czech Republic 
and Poland to seaborne platforms, were seen as further signs of accommodation. However, as 
a collective defence alliance NATO’s enlargement still tends to be perceived in military and 
(hard) security terms rather than in (soft) political terms.  
Specific interactions with Russia in the context of discussions about a NATO 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Georgia and Ukraine at the Alliance’s summit in 
Bucharest in April 2008 revealed the acute sensitivity of Russia towards potential NATO 
membership for Georgia and Ukraine, which was invoked as justification for Russia’s 
subsequent aggression in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (see Allison 2008). MAPs had been 
essential in preparing the entry of seven countries for full NATO membership in 2004. The 
strongest backing for a MAP for Georgia and Ukraine was particularly strong from the 
administration of George W. Bush while many NATO allies, especially Germany, Italy and 
Spain, opposed on the grounds of potential Russian responses. Hence, the supposition that 
discussion of a MAP would lead to eventual full membership was reasonable enough and, given 
the mandate of NATO, contributed to a deepening of the integration and security dilemmas.  
 By way of contrast, the nature of the EU’s engagement in Eastern Europe was framed 
in the context of closer association but, importantly, excluded full membership (to the 
frustration of a number of partner countries).9 The EU’s main tool for engagement instead 
consists of deep and comprehensive free trade agreements (DCFTA). These involve the 
adoption of a significant portion of the acquis communautaire by partner countries “thereby 
integrating them into the EU’s economic-legal space and diverting trade away from other 
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partners, including Russia” (Charap and Troitskiy 2013) but the level of commitment still 
fundamentally differs from the mutual extension of collective defence guarantees involved in 
NATO accession.10  
The technically astute might argue that the EU’s Association Agreements contain 
security components but these are mainly concerned with commitments to participate in CSDP 
missions and operations. If, by extension, it is then argued that the EU also suffers from a 
security dilemma, the counter-factual has to be asked: if indeed the EU is a threat to Russia’s 
key security interests, why has Russia itself contributed to a number of CSDP missions, such 
as in EUFOR Tchad/RCA in 2008-9 (with heavy airlift capacity) and in the EU police mission 
(EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 2002 onwards? 
When initially unveiled in 2003, the ENP concentrated on Europe’s immediate eastern 
neighbours, backed by the assumption that Russia would eventually want to be involved as 
such a “neighbour” as well. The presence of the EU as Russia’s largest market, and of Russia 
as the third trading partner for the EU, was assumed to be the bedrock of EU-Russia relations 
and the basis on which the Union and its members would deepen their relations with its direct 
eastern neighbours. The presence of the EU as Russia’s largest market, and of Russia as the 
third trading partner for the EU, was assumed to be the bedrock of EU-Russia relations and the 
basis on which the Union and its members would deepen its relations with its direct eastern 
neighbours. This was, in retrospect, a rather clumsy and overly Eurocentric approach 
considering that a politically self-confident Russia would very likely not appreciate being 
assigned the role of a satellite to the European project. Thus, instead of becoming directly 
involved in the ENP, Russia assumed a special status built around the EU-Russia Common 
Spaces based on a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) of 1994. The signing of the 
PCA was, by coincidence, the year in which President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, first 
suggested the notion of a Eurasian Union. Although the gestation of what eventually became 
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the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) was lengthy, it is worth noting conceptually it pre-dates 
ENP by a decade. Interestingly, there is nothing in the official documentation to suggest that 
the EU saw the emergence of the EEU as posing a reverse integration dilemma that would lead 
to zero-sum outcomes (in spite of the legal exclusion that would apply to the other if associated 
with either one). 
EU relations with Russia at the time were complicated by the European Commission’s 
preference for the four “common spaces” to move in parallel as part of a comprehensive 
framework, while Russia preferred progress based on mutual interest and dialogue on their 
shared neighbourhood (Trenin 2014). The “common spaces” were unveiled at the St Petersberg 
summit in May 2003 where the EU and Russia confirmed their determination to strengthen 
what was described as a “strategic partnership” – hardly the language associated with security 
dilemmas (Council 2004). The early years of ENP were unpromising, with the first major 
relaunch of the policy taking place in 2006. The EaP did then not appear until 2009, at the 
suggestion of the Polish and Swedish foreign ministers, and as EU-Russia relations had stalled 
over negotiations to update the 1994 PCA.  
The concerted European approach of the six EaP members (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) may suggest the appearance of an “everything but 
Russia” bloc but they are marked by enormous differences in perspective and enthusiasm for 
moving closer to the EU (Charap and Troitskiy 2013, 53). Belarus has traditionally kept the 
EaP at arm’s length with little enthusiasm for the EU’s normative dialogue, especially when it 
comes to democracy or the rule of law. Azerbaijan is also unenthusiastic about EU efforts to 
bolster civil society or for discussions on human rights.  The economic buoyancy provided 
through its oil wealth has also contributed to its lacklustre embrace of the EU.  
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Until relatively recently, Russia’s reactions to the EaP did not suggest the emergence, 
let alone the hardening of relationship in the sense of an integration dilemma. Putin even 
remained relaxed in response to Armenia’s 2013 intentions to sign an Association Agreement 
and DCFTA until pressure was exerted by Putin himself for Armenia to accede to the EEU. An 
integration dilemma as described by Charap and Troitskiy has developed more recently, 
primarily concerning Ukraine and, to an extent, Georgia and Moldova. Ukraine was well aware 
of the possibility of an integration dilemma, even prior to Maidan, which might have required 
a choice to be made “between either Western integration or a pro-Russia one” (Penkova 2013). 
President Viktor Yanukovich tried to balance the EU and Russia with, on the one hand, the 
choice of Brussels as his first official visit and, on the other, signing the Khariv Accords with 
Russia in 2010, which extended their lease on the Black Sea naval facilities from 2017 to 2042. 
Thereafter Yanukovich tried to concentrate on domestic affairs as a way of avoiding his own 
integration dilemma, but this proved unsuccessful since even nominally domestic matters 
became subject to proxy pressures (notably those stemming from the imprisonment of Yulia 
Tymoshenko and the price paid for natural gas).  
 Russia posited Ukraine’s accession to the EEU as a direct alternative to the signature 
of an Association Agreement and DCFTA with the EU. The Association Agreement was 
eventually signed in June 2014 with some aspects of the DCFTA applying provisionally since 
January 2016 and a visa waiver between the EU and Ukraine for non-work related visits of up 
to 90 days in April 2017. These developments have undoubtedly reinforced Russian 
perceptions of exclusivity on the part of the EU but the main barriers to the development of 
EU-Russia relations stem from the sanctions imposed on Russia following the annexation of 
Crimea and its subsequent interference in eastern Ukraine. It is far from clear that Russia wishes 
to have an exclusive relationship with Ukraine, especially if this might imply assuming the 
costs of economic reconstruction and addressing localised corruption.  
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 For understandable reasons the integration and security dilemmas have Ukraine as their 
core focus. It is though worth acknowledging the possibility of significant complications for 
all parties arising from the parlous state of Turkey’s respective relations with the EU, NATO 
and Russia (see Üstün 2016). Turkish relations with the EU and NATO have been strained, 
especially since the referendum to modify Turkey’s constitution in April 2017. This not only 
creates doubts about the longer-term compatibility of Turkey with the Union’s core values but 
also challenges NATO as increasingly pragmatic but closer ties develop between Turkey and 
Russia.  
Turkish receptivity towards Putin’s proposed “Turkish Stream” gas pipeline, which 
blocked progress on the EU’s preferred Southern Gas Corridor, is symptomatic of the state of 
the Union’s relations with Turkey. Tentative feelers have also been directed towards Ankara 
about a possible Free Trade Zone with the EEU. Turning to NATO, Turkey’s interest in 
purchasing the S-400 air defence system from Russia (and before that an inferior Chinese 
system) violates an unwritten rule within the Alliance that, wherever possible, systems should 
be either American or from the European allies for reasons of interoperability. On both counts, 
doubts about Turkey’s strategic direction and its future political character may significantly 
complicate relations between Turkey, the EU and NATO on the one hand, and Russia on the 
other.     
 The argument is not that the EU, NATO and Russia are about to engage in competition 
over Turkey, but it is more symptomatic of the ability of President Erdogan to exploit the 
geopolitical (and geoeconomic) sensitivities surrounding the integration dilemma, while at the 
same time Turkey is anxious to escape the exclusivity that lies at the heart of the dilemma. But, 
by so doing, Turkey risks deepening the integration dilemma with regard to the Caucasus, with 
Armenia opting for the EEU, Georgia with strong preferences for the EU and Azerbaijan trying 
to avoid close ties with either. It is also possible that proxy integration dilemmas could surface 
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further afield to Central Asia.  Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan’s desire to keep all parties at arm’s 
length might also suggest growing sensitivity to the negative consequences of the integration 
and security dilemmas. This suggests that longer-term stability probably lies in a wide-ranging 
Eurasian accommodation that goes beyond fealty to either the EU or the EEU.  
One of the paradoxes of the integration dilemma is that it is no longer about actual membership 
of the EU or NATO, but about the perceived proxy influence that comes about through the 
respect ante chambers of the organisations. In the case of the EU this is the six EaP while for 
NATO it is the Partnership for Peace programme with 22 non-NATO countries. Nor is it 
immediately apparent that the EU suffered from a security dilemma with Russia, while NATO 
arguably did. The question remains, however, of whether there was any consciousness of any 
differences between the integration dilemma as a variant of a wider security dilemma, or were 
they part of a wider trans-Atlantic attempt to constrain Russia’s influence to her immediate 
post-Cold War borders? 
Valdai’s dialogue of the deaf: liberal delusion or calculated risk? 
Early post-cold war Russian attempts to redraw “Europe as a Common Home” met with little 
interest from the West – especially when they were seen in some quarters as coming from a 
defeated country (Gorbachev 1989). The rebuff of these proposals and the emergence of what 
looked far from a common house coloured Putin’s views of the emerging Eurasia when he 
assumed power in 2000. Putin viewed EU and NATO integration as linked (while formally 
speaking, they are not, most of the 2004 and 2007 EU members had joined NATO beforehand 
based upon the implicit assumption that adherence to NATO values and principles would pave 
the way for EU membership).  Successive rounds of NATO enlargement in 1999, 2004 and 
2009, incorporating the former Soviet states and parts of the Western Balkans, followed by the 
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EU’s big bang enlargement by ten members in 2004 and more modest ones in 2007 and 2009, 
appeared to fundamentally redraw the political geography of Europe.  
Ukraine’s Orange Revolutions in late 2004 were followed by open requests from Viktor 
Yushchenko for a EU membership prospect in 2009 with strong popular backing. If anything, 
Russia was relatively restrained during the first Putin administrations but it was the prospects 
of an Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU that proved to be the thin end of a 
wedge that could eventually endanger Russia’s key strategic interests vis-a-vis Ukraine and, in 
particular, Crimea. Russia had signed a long-term lease with Ukraine for the naval base at 
Sevastopol (which, aside from being the home of the Black Sea Fleet, was also host to an 
extensive network of airfields, missile launch sites and radar installations). Based on the 
assumption that NATO enlargement and EU expansion were loosely related, Russia faced the 
unacceptable prospect of Sevastopol being taken over by units of the US Sixth Fleet. As Sakwa 
(2015, p. 102) argues: 
NATO may well no longer have been Russia’s enemy, but the prospect of its ships, missile 
defence units and various other bases along Russia’s borders represented a strategic defeat 
and existential threat of the first order. 
In Russian eyes, the interlocking expansion of the EU and NATO was part of the ongoing 
consolidation of the asymmetrical conclusion of the Cold War following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Putin made it clear at the Valdai International Discussion Club in 2014 that: 
We have told our American and European partners that hasty backstage decisions, for 
example, on Ukraine’s association with the EU, are fraught with serious risks to the 
economy. We didn’t even say anything about politics; we spoke only about the economy, 
saying that such steps, made without any prior arrangements, touch on the interests of 
many other nations, including Russia as Ukraine’s main trade partner, and that a wide 
discussion of the issues is necessary […] Russia does not need any kind of special, 
exclusive place in the world […] we simply want for our own interests to be taken into 
account and for our positions to be respected. (Putin 2014) 
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It is easy to ascribe the apparent American tin ear regarding Russia’s concerns about the 
emerging post-cold war international order to the administrations of George W. Bush and his 
neo-conservative advisors. However, such polarising difficulties were by no means confined 
to his administration. For instance, the decision to develop a Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) 
capability was made at the 2010 Lisbon Summit with an interim capability being declared two 
years later. The rationale was to provide full coverage and protection for NATO’s European 
population, territory and forces from ballistic missile threats emanating from beyond the Euro-
Atlantic area. In spite of remonstrations that the BMD capability “is purely defensive and not 
directed against Russia”, it was never seen as such by Putin (NATO: 2016a). He saw it as “an 
attempt to destroy the strategic balance, to change the balance of forces in their favour not only 
to dominate, but to have the opportunity to dictate their will to all: to their geopolitical 
competition and, I believe, to [America’s] allies as well” (Putin: 2015).  
There is no doubt that the Obama administration and NATO’s Secretary-General believed in 
their remonstrations, but what is questionable is the resistance to heed Russian warnings that 
NATO and EU actions were seen as essentially geopolitical in nature, even if both avowed 
otherwise. John Mearsheimer (2014, p. 78) referred to this kind of apparent disconnect as the 
“liberal delusion”. He argued that: 
Elites in the United States and Europe have been blindsided by events only because they 
subscribed to a flawed view of international politics. They tend to believe that the logic of 
realism holds little relevance in the twenty-first century and that Europe can be kept whole 
and free on the basis of such liberal principles as the rule of law, economic 
interdependency, and democracy. 
Mearsheimer’s argument suggests that the EU and NATO were pursuing post-modernist 
agendas, convinced of their own normative superiority and of the low likelihood of armed 
aggression between Russia, the EU and NATO – until Russia’s aggression in Crimea and proxy 
involvement in Ukraine made this untenable. In this interpretation, the EU and NATO were 
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naïve and were unable to accept Putin’s counter-narrative other than that of an unenlightened 
“modern” authoritarian nemesis. Alternatively, one could argue that the EU and NATO were 
quite aware of the geopolitical stakes. Behind the normative façade one would expect to find 
careful calculations of the risks linked to broader strategic goals that ultimately promoted a 
specific approach to global governance. There is only cursory evidence to back this up 
stemming from public statements, such as that emanating from NATO’s 1999 New Strategic 
Concept, which saw the enlargement of NATO as serving “the overall political and strategic 
interests of the Alliance, strengthen its effectiveness and cohesion, and enhance overall 
European security and stability” (NATO 1999). Even the EU’s offer of a “reinforced 
relationship, based on shared democratic values” made in its key strategic document on Russia, 
also adopted in 1999, could be construed as less benign and more geopolitical in nature 
(European Council 1999). Evidence of any such strategic purposiveness is, however, 
circumstantial.  
It is more likely that the EU and NATO acted out of strategic naïveté rather than any 
grand strategic design – let alone one that was sufficiently coordinated to be termed genuinely 
transatlantic. Russia’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine awoke both organisations (although the 
earlier intervention in Georgia should have done so) to the nature of the world on their littoral 
and beyond. The ending of the alleged “liberal delusion” also marked the end of the “strategic 
unconsciousness” of both organisations (Duke 2017). More recently the often-held normative 
bias of the EU has given way to “principled pragmatism” which, according to the High 
Representative, will “guide our external action in the years ahead” (Global Strategy 2016, p. 
8). Prior to the adoption of the EUGS, in the High Representative’s 2015 Strategy Review, 
reference was made on several occasions to the need for “nuanced realism” in the face of an 
increasingly complex world (EEAS 2015). Although the precise meaning of both phrases is 
unclear, they nevertheless suggest a change from the normatively charged language that is 
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commonly associated with the EU’s external communication.  Both documents were presaged 
by a review of the ENP which adopted a far more “pragmatic” tone, especially when it came 
to recognising that “not all partners aspire to EU rules and standards” and that there should 
therefore be “different ambitions, abilities and interests” (European Commission 2015, p. 4). 
Popular discontent within the EU also made the idea of promoting the Union as exemplar at 
the heart of its external engagement problematic.  
The perceptions of the integration and security dilemmas from a Russian standpoint 
appear to differ between the internal and external audiences. For the internal audience the 
messaging is very much one of the classical security dilemma focussing, most recently, on how 
Montenegro’s accession to NATO ‘deepens the dividing lines in Europe’ (Grushko: 2016). 
Such representation also fits Putin’s wish to portray a beleaguered Russia with a strong leader 
who not only defends the country’s geostrategic interests, but is also determined to restore its 
international standing.  
Externally, the messaging is more careful. Putin’s 2014 Valdai speech, part of which is 
quoted above, is careful to single out the economic dimensions of the integration dilemma. 
Although this is slightly disingenuous, since there are clear political considerations involved in 
the economic dimensions, it nevertheless reopens the question of whether a more nuanced 
approach to the impasse between the EU and NATO’s relations with Russia, and vice versa, 
might not be addressed by more explicit recognition of the fact that while both organisations 
clearly suffer from an integration dilemma, the EU does not necessarily carry with it the 
baggage of a security dilemma other than via the largely overlapping membership of the two 
organisations. 
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Prospects for deconfliction 
The EU primarily faces an integration dilemma due to the fact that the primary means of the 
contested engagement with its partners to the east, or Russia’s “inner abroad”, is heavily trade-
oriented. There are of course important nuances:  the EU is not exclusively a civilian power 
and there are security dimensions to the agreements with the eastern neighbours. The fact  that 
the EU’s security involvement in operations fall principally outside Europe and that a number 
have benefitted from Ukrainian and/or Russian contributions suggests that the security 
dilemma stems from more local or regional considerations and does not necessarily block 
security cooperation elsewhere. Further mutual engagement could therefore be approached by 
the EU as confidence building measures in the wider process or rebuilding relations with 
Russia. 
Much will also depend upon the extent to which there is interest on the part of the EU’s Member 
States to promote the Union’s defence-related role based upon perceptions of conditionality to 
the American security guarantees provided through NATO. Efforts to bolster defence 
expenditure and capabilities within the EU and to assume a quasi “Article 5” role within the 
EU could ensnare the Union in something that looks far more like a security dilemma. But, for 
the moment, this is not the case.   
NATO, by way of contrast, is engaged in something that bears a stronger resemblance to a 
classical security dilemma with efforts to bolster security by one party met by reciprocal (and 
often asymmetrical) reactions on the other. There remains an open question about the extent to 
which Putin is willing to distinguish between the EU and NATO but past Russian involvement 
in CSDP missions suggests that there may be a margin of manoeuvre in the case of the Union 
that does not currently exist with the Alliance.  The EU and NATO are, however, at risk of 
reinforcing Putin’s internal messaging portraying the EU and NATO as the cause of a security 
dilemma with, for example, the EU-NATO Joint Declaration of July 2016 which formed part 
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of the Union’s defence package (EU-NATO Declaration: 2016).  More, not less, differentiation 
between the EU and NATO might therefore be helpful, but not to the extent that it would allow 
Putin to exploit open differences (Turkey being of concern in this regard). 
Greater differentiation would allow the EU to work on reducing its integration dilemma with 
Russia at several levels. At the broadest level the EU will have to enter into dialogue with 
Russia if the notion of ‘cooperative regional orders’, as expressed in the Global Strategy, are 
to have substance, especially on the Middle East. The EU could also consider proposing 
bilateral and multilateral ways of cooperating in the EU’s EaP and the EEU as well as in areas 
of growing mutual interest, like Central Asia. This would have to be done on the basis of non-
exclusivity which would mean addressing thorny legal issues like whether association with 
both the EEU and EU is possible and, if so, under what arrangements. The extension of 
economic incentives should be done on the explicit respect for the independence of the parties 
involved so that they do not become the objects of further or new proxy struggles, the potential 
for which is already apparent in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Any renewed engagement by 
the EU with Russia should also pay close attention to Turkey with the emphasis upon economic 
cooperation and conflict resolution.  
The largely overlapping membership of the EU and NATO suggests that the engagement of 
the majority of the Union’s members, who are also Alliance members, will help to create a 
more conducive atmosphere to change the zero-sum mindsets that underpin the security 
dilemma where the nature of any competition is far more intractable and less prone to 
agreement on power-sharing solutions. Importantly, any willingness to address the EU’s 
integration dilemma with Russia would make it more difficult to Putin to maintain that the EU 
and NATO are part of a classical competition for international influence fuelled by an 
underpinning security dilemma. 
	25 
 
Conclusions 
This contribution builds upon Charap and Troitskiy’s notion of the integration dilemma. They 
acknowledge that it is a variant of the security dilemma. We accept their argument that the EU 
and NATO suffer from an integration dilemma, but we note that they are of an essentially 
different nature. That of the EU is more closely associated with economic and trade 
competition, especially the proposed Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements with 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, while that of NATO is associated with cooperation on a broad 
range of security issues. While we acknowledge that there are clear nuances in this statement 
for both organisations, the underlying point is that the nature of the integration dilemmas 
differs.   
Moreover, the “integration” that has been posited is not that of full membership, with the 
notable exception of the Western Balkans, some of whom are already EU and NATO members, 
while others are in the wings. This opens up the possibility of different forms of 
accommodation, short of full membership (or, “exclusivity”, to use the terminology of the 
integration dilemma). Granted, it is precisely the current integration without membership that 
is the source of tension, but there are also important areas of exclusivity that risk becoming 
dogma (such as the incompatibility of EU and EEU membership). Efforts at accommodation, 
even initially symbolic, might provide positive messages for countries in the Caucasus, Central 
Asia and even Turkey who are acutely aware of the integration dilemma and who will either 
exploit EU, NATO and Russian differences for their ends, or who will avoid any form of 
cooperation out of self-preservation.  
The main conundrum in Charap and Troitskiy’s integration dilemma is that they do not explore 
the linkages between the integration and security dilemmas or, critically, their differences. We 
argue that significant steps towards deconfliction might, however, be attained by the 
recognition that the EU and NATO both suffer from an integration dilemma with Russia, but 
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both do not necessarily share a security dilemma with Russia. A security dilemma is in many 
ways more intractable, while creative approaches to the integration dilemma on the EU’s part 
could begin to undermine the logic of the security dilemma.  
A security dilemma, fuelled by realist perspectives, will be far harder to unravel. Russia has its 
largest military presence in Europe since the end of the Cold War and challenges to air and sea 
space are almost a daily occurrence. The presence of significant forces, including nuclear 
munitions, is also part of a deterrence posture that is at the heart of the security dilemma. Top-
down approaches aimed at addressing the security dilemma are likely to be far less successful 
than bottom-up approaches aimed at addressing aspects of the integration dilemma.  
It will admittedly take enormous vision and courage to move towards creative solutions that 
share power and influence, whilst respecting the concerns and desires of the EU and Russia’s 
neighbours (and increasingly the neighbours-of-the-neighbours). Failure to make progress on 
this front will cause more uncertainty and make it problematic for those who have thus far 
avoided the Siren calls of exclusivity to do so in the future. It is in the interests of the EU and 
its members to insist that an integration dilemma does not become a security dilemma. It should 
also be in NATOs interest since any start to unravelling their security dilemma with Russia 
appears to lie in first addressing the EUs integration dilemma. In spite of evidence that EU-
NATO cooperation is making tentative progress, distinctiveness may not be an entirely bad 
thing.  
  
	27 
 
References 
Allison, R., 2008. Russia resurgent? Moscow's campaign to ‘coerce Georgia to peace’, 
International Affairs, 84(6), 1145-1171. 
Biscop, S., 2012. The UK and European defence: leading or leaving? International Affairs, 88, 
1297–1313. 
Blockmans S. and Faleg G., 2015. More Union in European Defence. Brussels: Centre for 
European Policy Studies and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
Booth, K. and N. Wheeler, 1992. Contending Philosophies about Security in Europe. In: 
McInnes, C., ed., Security and Strategy in the New Europe. London: Routledge, 3-36. 
Booth, K. and N. Wheeler, 2008. The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World 
Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Burns R.N. and Jones J.L., 2016. Restoring the Power and Purpose of the NATO Alliance, 
Atlantic Council, Brent Scowcroft Centre on International Security, June.  
Carpenter, T.G., 2016. NATO is an institutional dinosaur, Cato Institute, 25 August. 
Charap, S. and M. Troitskiy, 2013. Russia, the West and the Integration Dilemma. Survival, 
55(6), 49–62. 
Cordesman, A.H., 2005. Rethinking NATO’s force transformation. NATO Review, Spring. 
Corry, O., 2012. Securitisation and ‘Riskification’: Second-order Security and the Politics of 
Climate Change. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 40(2), January, 235–258. 
Council of the European Union, 2004, EU/Russia: The Four Common Spaces, Memo/04/268, 
23 November. 
	28 
 
Council of the European Union, 2016, ‘EU-NATO cooperation: Council adopts conclusions to 
implement Joint Declaration’, Press Release 728/16, 6 December. 
Daalder I. and Goldgeier J., 2006. Global NATO. Foreign Affairs, 85(5) September/October, 
105–113. 
Duke, S. and Vanhoonacker, S., 2016. EU-NATO Relations: Top-Down Strategic Paralysis 
and Bottom-Up Cooperation. In: Chappell, L., Mawdsley, J. and P. Petrov, eds, The EU, 
Strategy and Security Policy: Regional and Strategic Challenges. London: Routledge, 153–
169. 
Duke, S., 2017. Europe as a Stronger Global Actor: Challenges and Strategic Responses. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan. 
EEAS, 2015. The European Union in a changing global environment: A more connected, 
contested and complex world, European External Action Service, July. 
EPP, 2016. Towards a European Defence Union, European People’s Party Group Position 
Paper. 
European Commission, 2015. Joint Communication to the European Parliament, The Council, 
The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Review of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy, JOIN(2015) final, Brussels, 18 November. 
European Council, 1999. Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia, 4 June 
(1999/414/CFSP). 
European Parliament, 2015. Towards a new European security strategy? Assessing the impact 
of changes in the global security environment. Report of the Policy Department, Directorate-
General for External Policies, EP/EXPO/B/SEDE/FWC/2013-08/Lot6/05. 
	29 
 
EU-NATO Joint Declaration (2016),  Joint Declaration by the President of the European 
Council, The President of the European Commission and the Secretary-General of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, 8 July.  
Gebhard C. and Smith S.J., 2015. The two faces of EU-NATO cooperation: Counter-piracy 
operations off the Somali coast. Cooperation and Conflict, 50(1), 107–127.  
Global Strategy (2016), Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy 
for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June. 
Gorka, A., 2017, ‘NATO Builds Infrastructure for Permanent Military Presence near Russia’s 
Border’, Strategic Culture Foundation, 15 May. 
Græger, N., 2016. European Security as Practice: Towards an EU-NATO Community-in-the-
making? European Security, 25 (4), 478–501 (Special issue: European Diplomatic Practices) 
Græger N. and Haugevik K.M., 2013. The EU’s Performance with and within NATO: 
Assessing Objectives, Outcomes and Organisational Practices. Journal of European 
Integration, 33 (6), 743–757. 
Grushko, A., 2016. Montenegro Accession to NATO Deepens Division within Europe. 
Sputnik, 21 May.  
Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. & Wallender, C., eds., 1999. Imperfect unions: security 
institutions over time and space. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hallams, E., Ratti, L. & Zyla, B., eds., 2014. NATO beyond 9/11: the Transformation of the 
Atlantic Alliance. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Haukkala, H. 2000. ‘From Zero-Sum to Win-Win? The Russian Challenge to the EU’s Eastern 
Neighbourhood Policies’, European Policy Analysis, Swedish Institute for European Policy 
Studies, Issue 12, November.  
	30 
 
Hellmann G., and Wolf R., 1992. Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of 
NATO. Security Studies, 3 (1), 3–43. 
Herz, J.H., 1950. Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma, World Politics. 2 (2), 
171–201. 
Herz, J.H., 1951. Political Realism and Political Idealism. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Himmrich J. and Raynova D., 2017. EU-NATO Relations: Inching forward?, European 
Leadership Network, May. 
House of Representatives, 2017. Department of Defense Appropriations for 2017: Hearings 
before a Subcommittee of the Committee of Appropriations, House of Representatives, 114th 
Congress, Second Session, 22 March 2016 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office). 
Howorth, J., 2010. The EU as a Global Actor: Grand Strategy for a Global Grand Bargain. 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 48 (3), 455–474. 
Jervis R., 1978. Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30 (2), January. 
167–214. 
Kohler, B., 2016. Das ganz und gar Undenkbare. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 
November at http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/nach-donald-trump-sieg-deutschland-
muss-aussenpolitik-aendern-14547858.html [Accessed 30 April 2017]. 
Lang, K-O. and Lippert, B., 2015. EU Options on Russ and the Eastern Partners. SWP 
Comments, May. 
Lanoszka, A., 2016. Russian hybrid warfare and extended deterrence in eastern Europe. 
International Affairs, 92(1), 175–195. 
	31 
 
Mearsheimer, J., 2014. ‘Why Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault’, Foreign Affairs, 93(5), 
September/October, 77–90. 
Merkel, A., 2017. Statement at the Munich Security Conference, 18 February 2017. 
https://www.securityconference.de/en/media-library/munich-security-conference-
2017/video/statement-by-angela-merkel/ [Accessed 2 May 2017]. 
Mogherini F., 2016. Opening remarks by the High Representative/Vice-President Federica 
Mogherini at the EU Ambassadors Conference ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger 
Europe’, Brussels, 5 September. 
Monaghan, A., 2015. A ‘New Cold War’? Abusing History, Misunderstanding Russia. 
Chatham House Research Paper. 
Mowle, T. S. and D. H. Sacko, 2008. Global NATO: Bandwagoning in a Unipolar World. 
Contemporary Security Policy, 28 (3),597–618. 
NAC, 1998. Remarks by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to the North Atlantic Council 
ministerial meeting, Brussels, 8 December. 
NATO, 1999. The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and 
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 24 April. 
NATO, 2016a. Fact Sheet: NATO Ballistic Missile Defence, July.  
NATO, 2016b. Warsaw Summit Communiqué, issued by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Warsaw, 8–9 July.  
Gentiloni P. 2016. The EU needs a ‘Schengen for Defence’. Politico.eu, 15 September.  
Penkova, T., 2013. ‘EU or Russia? Ukraine’s recurrent (non) integration dilemma’, ISPI 
Analysis, No. 150, January. 
	32 
 
Posener A., 2016. ‘In Defense of the Baltics’, Carnegie Europe, 4 August at 
http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/64244 [Accessed 30 April 2017]. 
Popescu, N., 2014. ‘Eurasian Union: The real, the imaginary and the likely’, Chaillot Papers, 
September. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies. 
Putin V., 2014. Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, Sochi, 24 October at 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/23137 [Accessed 30 April 2017]. 
Putin V., 2015. Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, Sochi, 22 October at 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50548 [Accessed 30 April 2017]. 
Reuters, 2016. U.S. defense budget focuses on changing security environment: Carter’, 
Reuters, 2 February. 
Reuters, 2017. Russia warns of serious consequences from U.S. strike in Syria, Reuters, 8 
April. 
Rieker, P., 2013. The French return to NATO: Reintegration in practice, not in principle. 
European Security, 22 (3), 376–394. 
Sakwa, R., 2015. Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands. London: I.B. Tauris. 
Saxi, H.L., 2017. British and German initiatives for defence cooperation: the Joint 
Expeditionary Force and the Framework Nations Concept. Defence Studies, 17(2), 171-197. 
Shlapak, D.A. and Johnson, M.W., 2016. Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: 
Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics, RAND Corporation. 
Sokolsky, R. 2017. ‘The New NATO-Russia Military Balance: Implications for European 
Security’, Task Force White Paper, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 13 March at 
	33 
 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/13/new-nato-russia-military-balance-implications-for-
european-security-pub-68222 [Accessed 30 April 2017]. 
Trenin D., 2005. ‘Russia, the EU and the common neighbourhood’, Essays, Centre for 
European Reform, September. 
Tzimitras H. and Hatay M., 2016. ‘The Need for Realism: Solving the Cyprus problem through 
linkage politics’, Turkey Project Policy Paper, No. 9, October (Washington DC: The 
Brookings Institution).  
U.S. Senate, 2014. Russia Aggression Prevention Act, 113th Congress, 2013–2014. 
Üstün, Ç., 2016. Turkey’s Policies in Its Overlapping Neighbourhood with Russia and the 
European Union. In: L. Simão and R. Piet, eds. Security in Shared Neighbourhoods: Foreign 
Policy of Russia, Turkey and the EU. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 53–74. 
Van Evera, S., 1999. Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
Webber, M. and Hyde-Price, A., 2016. Theorising NATO: New Perspectives on the Atlantic 
Alliance. London and New York: Routledge. 
White House, 2017. Remarks by the Vice President and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg 
at a JPA. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/20/remarks-vice-president-
and-nato-secretary-general-stoltenberg-jpa [accessed 2 May 2017] 
Wolff, A.T., 2009. The structural and political crisis of NATO transformation’, Journal of 
Transatlantic Studies, 7 (4), 476–492. 
Zyla, B., 2016. Who is keeping the peace and who is free-riding? International Politics. 53 (3), 
303–323.  
	34 
 
Notes 
1 NATO’s Warsaw Summit Communiqué of 8-9 July 2016, reaches 139 paragraphs. 
2 At the time of writing both have 28 members. Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and 
Sweden are EU members but not NATO members, while Albania, Iceland, Norway and 
Turkey are NATO members but not EU members (Albania is an EU candidate).  
3 The ambivalence surrounding EU-NATO relations often suggests polar interpretations. An 
Atlanticist interpretation, especially from a British perspective, might suggest that the EU, or 
at least its security and defence aspects, provide a useful and largely convergent “European 
pillar” within the Atlantic alliance.  In this view, NATO is very much the primary security 
actor, and any autonomy claimed by the EU depends mainly upon a right of first refusal from 
the Alliance’s principal members. These tensions were evident following the publication of 
the Anglo-French St Malo Declaration in December 1998. A more divergent, and historically 
Europeanist view, tends to stress the lack of convergence on multiple levels, ranging from 
membership, to mission, security versus defence, to doubts about the reliability of the U.S. 
and, ultimately, the implied nuclear guarantees. However, the Europeanist camp never went 
so far as to propose formal separation (see Zyla 2016). Even France, under de Gaulle, did not 
leave NATO completely but only left its Integrated Military Command. 
4 The VJTF is still in an interim format, with the bulk of the forces being provided by 
Germany, the Netherlands and Norway. The VJTF will come into full operation in 2017.  
5 Despite the differences in borders implied by the slightly differing membership of the EU and 
NATO there was no perceptible difference in the geopolitical assessment of the resulting 
littoral security challenges. 
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6	Brexit has also refuelled discussions about duplication, for example by reopening the option 
of an autonomous EU military command structure – a move the UK had worked against for a 
number of years (Biscop 2012). 
7	The Eastern Partnership is a joint policy initiative launched at the Prague Summit in May 
2009 that aims to deepen and strengthen relations between the EU and its six Eastern 
neighbours: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.  
8 By way of comparison, NATO’s Exercise Steadfast Jazz in November 2013 involved 6,000 
personnel. 
9 NATO currently has four candidates for membership while the EU has five (albeit with no 
ambitions to consider further enlargement prior to 2019 in the latter’s case). 
10 There are three DCFTA countries to the EU’s east (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) with 
the first two having entered into force in July 2016. Charap and Troitskiy (2013) are correct 
to argue that DCFTAs imply exclusivity in the sense that participation legally prohibits 
engagement in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) (as in the case of Armenia who is an 
EEU member). But, it is worth noting the voluntary nature of the Association Agreements 
with the EU and membership of the EEU, with a significant trimming of Putin’s original 
ambition to create a “distinctive pole of influence in a multipolar world by reversing the 
‘civilised divorce’ of the former Soviet republics of the USSR” (Popescu 2014, p. 7). 
